Reflections of a monetary policymaker by William Poole
M
uch of my thinking over the past 10 
years as president of the St. Louis Fed 
has been devoted to monetary policy—both 
the strategy (the big-picture objectives of 
price stability and real economic growth)  
and the tactics (the specific actions taken  
by the FOMC to achieve those objectives).   
More specifically, I’ve concentrated on how 
the actions fit the strategy.
The study of these matters for central 
bankers (and many others) is important for 
two reasons.  First, the central bank—just 
like any other public or private body that 
makes important decisions—must not act 
on the basis of whim.  We must think ahead 
of time about the circumstances that would 
require any particular action.  Second, for a 
central bank to achieve good outcomes for 
the economy, private decision-makers need 
not only understand monetary policy but 
need to form sensible expectations about 
future policy actions.
The formation of these expectations led 
to one of my first surprises as a monetary 
policymaker.  As a longtime academic, I 
knew the professional literature in econom-
ics was full of insights into the importance 
of private-sector expectations about policy. 
But there was virtually nothing in the 
literature on how those expectations were 
formed.  That became important to me as I 
started talking regularly with the press and 
other outsiders; it was clear that I needed to 
become part of the process of trying to  
establish correct expectations. 
The expectations of the traders, journalists 
and others I was addressing were sometimes 
off-course because so often they were focus-
ing on the “now”—what will affect them 
in the next few hours or days.  They always 
wanted my prediction for what the FOMC 
would do at its next meeting, even if it were 
several weeks away.  My standard answer was 
that I do not forecast policy decisions; rather, 
my job was to participate in making policy 
decisions.  And those decisions—the specific 
actions—often had to be made at the FOMC 
meetings themselves because of late-breaking 
data or new arguments from fellow FOMC 
members at the meetings.
(Truth be told, over the years, I realized that 
even I had to be more flexible in my assess-
ments of needed actions and not get stuck on 
a policy action that I thought for sure was the 
right one only days ahead of a meeting.) 
Because today’s FOMC believes it’s impor-
tant not to surprise the markets, the commit-
tee started in 1999 at its regular rate-setting 
meetings to issue formal guidance to the 
public on the likely direction of future policy. 
I initially embraced this communication.  If 
the committee were on the edge of raising the 
target, why not reveal that information?  Then, 
the market could observe incoming informa-
tion and decide whether strong data reports 
might complete the case for raising the target.
But several problems arose.  It was harder 
than expected for the market to determine 
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when incoming data made the case to change 
the funds rate target as suggested in the guid-
ance.  Sometimes, the data came in the other 
way, in which case the committee might 
want to change the target in the opposite 
direction to what was suggested earlier; this 
was awkward and could be interpreted incor-
rectly by the markets.  Still another problem 
I had with such guidance:  If the committee 
had a strong feeling as to what needed to be 
done at the next meeting, why not take care 
of it right away?  Given lags in the effects of 
policy action, the current policy had to be 
based on the future outlook.
Because of these problems, I’ve now come 
to the conclusion that any forward guidance 
in the policy statement issued at each FOMC 
meeting causes more communications dif-
ficulties than it solves.
If these reasons don’t carry enough weight 
for critics, they need to know that the econ-
omy is shocked more often than most people 
realize, and those shocks can’t be ignored 
because of policy guidance from a month 
earlier.  I once thought that these shocks 
occurred only occasionally.  But in my years at 
the Fed, I’ve found out that they are continual.   
Think of Long-term Capital Management, the 
dot-com bust, 9/11, the war in Iraq and now 
the subprime mortgage meltdown.
The shocks have become so normal that 
the markets are getting quite good at dealing 
with them on their own.  Sometimes, the 
best thing the Fed can do is stay on the side-
lines.  When action is needed, however, the 
markets, the press and the public in general 
need to understand that the FOMC will 
move in accordance with its overall objec-
tives … and not act on a whim. 
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